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PolicyClimate policy recommendations differ widely because of disagreements over what discount rates to use.
Disagreement reduces the impact of economic models and signals a need for improved methodology. The
problem is related to the choice of intergenerational welfare functions. A ﬁrst questionnaire ﬁnds that the
standard welfare function (SWF) fails to capture people's dislike of overshooting and ﬂuctuating consumption
paths. A second questionnaire reveals that when very-long-term sustainability of well-being is threatened,
people's implicit discount rates resemble the low estimates used by the Stern Review. An alternative welfare
function (AWF) reﬂecting consumption growth can potentially capture the preference structure revealed in
both questionnaires. This makes the AWF an interesting candidate when searching for policies for sustainable
development under uncertainty. Importantly, the questionnaires demonstrate that people are able to choose
among policies by inspecting time graphs of policy consequences. Thus, it is possible to circumvent the
complexities and disagreements introduced by welfare functions and discounting.
© 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-SA license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).1. Introduction
According to Heal (1997) discounting has always been a source of
controversy within the economics profession. Extensive advanced
analyses of welfare economics have not resolved the underlying issues.
Dasgupta (2008, p.167) remarks that “[i]ntergenerational welfare eco-
nomics raises more questions than it is able to answer satisfactorily.”
This article, while focused on climate change and sustainability, takes
a closer look at underlying assumptions that have not been properly
tested until now.
It needs to be resolved whether the standard (social) welfare
function (SWF) is representative of people's preferences regarding
long-term developments. Of particular interest are preferences regard-
ing overshoots in consumption (or well-being) in the form of ﬂuctua-
tions or unsustainable developments. If the SWF is not representative,
are there better alternatives? One may even ask if it is possible to do
without welfare functions and discounting. Could decision-makers
simply rank order policies by inspecting graphs showing simulated
policy consequences over time? In case welfare functions are used to
search for or to rank policy proposals, what parameters do people's
preferences for different time developments imply?
The practical problem of using the SWF is illustrated by the widely
differing tax rates for greenhouse gases (GHGs) recommended by. This is an open access article underNordhaus (2001) and the Stern Review (2007) (hereafter, “Nordhaus”
and “Stern”). The fact that these tax rates differ by a factor of ten can
predominantly be explained by the divergent arguments behind the au-
thors' choices of discount rates (Nordhaus, 2007, p.700). Pronounced
disagreements are present and problematic. While both studies do rec-
ommend positive GHG taxes, the wide gap between the recommended
tax rates is likely to reduce policymakers' conﬁdence in both the results
and in the methods of analysis. Consistent with the academic debate, a
recent report by the US Administration presents estimates of the social
costs of carbon emissions that differ by a factor of ﬁve due to the same
doubt about what discount rate to use (Interagency Working Group
on Social Cost of Carbon, 2013).
The article is organized as follows. First, hypotheses regarding wel-
fare functions are presented: the standard (SWF) and an alternative
welfare function (AWF). Then comes the experimental design with
two questionnaires and a discussion of the potential for overshoots
and unsustainable developments in future per capita consumption or
well-being. Third, results from the ﬁrst questionnaire show that people
dislike overshoots, an effect captured by the AWF but not by the SWF.
The second questionnaire reveals very low implicit discount rates
when subjects are confronted with unsustainable very-long-term de-
velopments. Fourth, the results are discussed in light of the academic
debate over discounting. A distinction is made between the determinis-
tic case and the case of uncertainty. The questionnaires demonstrate
that people are able to choose between policies by inspecting their
consequences in terms of time developments. Thus, one could avoid
complexities and uncertainties introduced by welfare functions andthe CC BY-NC-SA license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).
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the AWF, particularly in the case of uncertainty.
2. Hypotheses
Howdo people evaluate thewelfare effects of various developments
in per capita consumption? In particular, how do they react to
overshoots in terms of ﬂuctuations or unsustainable developments?
One possibility is that they discount future utility according to a now
standard (social) welfare function (SWF):
W ¼
X∞
t¼0
u ct Pð Þ½ = 1þ δð Þt : ð1Þ
Here u[ct(P)] denotes utility derived from per capita consumption ct
in year t for policy P, and δ denotes the utility discount rate (also called
the “pure rate of social time preference”).1 Single period utility is given
as:
u ct Pð Þ½  ¼ c1−ηt = 1−ηð Þ ð2Þ
where η is the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption, or
consumption elasticity for short. For positive values of η, utility increases
more and more slowly as per capita consumption increases (concave).
When η= 0, utility equals consumption and δ will represent the more
familiar consumption discount rate. The null hypothesis is:
H10. People make choices between per capita consumption develop-
ments according to the SWF. The SWF is followed consistently in that
δ and η do not change with consumption scenarios.
A main reason to question this hypothesis is that the SWF does not
discriminate against all types of non-monotonic consumption develop-
ments. Think of a consumption path that ﬂuctuates around a monoton-
ically increasing path. If both paths yield the same discounted utility, it
seems likely that people would prefer the monotonic development.
Hourcade et al. (2009) make the same point with illustrating examples.
One possible alternative welfare function (AWF) that is averse to
ﬂuctuations and overshoots is the discounted utility of relative growth
in per capita consumption:
W ¼
X∞
t¼0
u gt Pð Þ½ = 1þ δð Þt ð3Þ
where gt = (ct− ct − 1) / ct − 1 denotes the growth rate of per capita
consumption in year t for policy P. As before, δ denotes the utility
discount rate. The following single period exponential utility function
is assumed:
u gt Pð Þ½  ¼ 1−e−gt=α
 
ð4Þ
where the parameter α determines the concavity of the utility function.
Since it seems that the AWF has not been used in intertemporal welfare
economics before, it needs some further explanation and prior
justiﬁcation.
First, consider a situation where all allowable policies produce
constant per capita consumption growth rates. Then there would be a
ﬁxed relationship between the constant growth rate and the consump-
tion path thatwould follow. Hence,maximizing the sumof growth rates
(AWF) would lead to the same result as maximizing the sum of per
capita consumption (SWF) over time. Since both utility functions are
increasing monotonically, this conclusion is not changed by the intro-
duction of utility. Nor does the utility discount rate matter in this case.1 The welfare function represents a situation with a constant population or one where
population size only inﬂuences per capita consumption.Second, consider minor deviations from the constant growth rate
scenario. Since consumption accumulates growth rates over time, con-
sumption will react only gradually to deviations in growth rates. Intui-
tively, this suggests that the SWF must operate with lower utility
discount rates than the AWF to yield similar conclusions. This intuition
can be tested by the use of Nordhaus' DICEmodel.2 The standard version
of DICE makes use of the SWF with δ= 1.5% p.a. and η= 2. When the
SWF is replaced with the AWF with δ = 1.5% p.a. and α = 0.02, the
savings rate ends up about 15% above the one for the SWF.With a higher
discount rate for the AWF of δ=2.5%p.a. the twowelfare functions give
nearly identical results.
Third, the above testworkedwell becauseDICEproducespositive con-
sumption growth rates that do not change much over time. If the model
had produced ﬂuctuations or overshoots in consumption, the AWF
would have led to different policy recommendations. While both welfare
functions make use of concave utility functions, much larger relative var-
iations in growth rates than in yearly consumption explain the difference.
The AWF is supported by several empirical ﬁndings. The Easterlin
paradox says that the level of consumption does not matter for happi-
ness, except when basic needs are not satisﬁed (Easterlin, 1974).
While this may be true and should be taken into consideration, it is
not obvious that it is fully reﬂected in people's preferences. Most people
seem to prefer more to less. However, such preferencemay to some ex-
tent be cast in terms of preferences for growth. Frederick et al. (2002)
refer to research showing that people prefer improving sequences of
wages to declining sequences, present values being equal. Scitovsky
(1976) argues that pleasure derived from change is more important
for well-being than comfort. If change is stimulated by growth, while
comfort relates to the stock of durable consumer goods, growthmatters
more than the level of consumption. According to prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) people consider projects in terms of
losses and gains around reference points rather than in terms of effects
on total wealth. Duesenberry's ratchet effect (Duesenberry, 1949)
suggests that negative growth may have a stronger absolute effect on
utility than positive growth (concave utility function).
A few more clarifying comments are needed. First, leaving out con-
siderations of basic needs in the AWF is probably of limited concern in
aggregate models with a minimum of growth potential. It seems far
more important when considering distributions between groups. Sec-
ond, exponential utilitymeans that the AWF does not showdiminishing
sensitivity to negative growth rates, different from the treatment of
losses in prospect theory. However, in aggregate planning models it
does not seem desirable to play down the importance of large negative
growth rates.
The null hypothesis reads:
H20. People make choices between per capita consumption develop-
ments according to the AWF. The AWF is used consistently in that δ
and α do not change with consumption scenarios.
A second type of question concerns the sizes of implicit utility
discount rates and consumption elasticities that can be derived from
subjects' choices among scenarios for per capita consumption or well-
being. How do the implicit parameters compare to the assumptions
made by Nordhaus and Stern?3. Experimental Design
The ﬁrst questionnaire with questions Q1 and Q2 deals with over-
shooting and ﬂuctuating consumption developments. The second,
with questions Q3, Q4, andQ5, dealswith very-long-termunsustainable
developments where well-being never recovers after an overshoot.2 Version DICE-2007.delta.v8 (Nordhaus, 2008).
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Fig. 1. Per capita consumption paths for Q1. Fig. 3. Indifference curves based on the SWF for Q1 and Q2, and assumptions made by
Nordhaus and Stern.
160 E. Moxnes / Ecological Economics 102 (2014) 158–1663.1. First Questionnaire
In questions Q1 and Q2, subjects were asked to choose one of two
per capita consumption paths or declare indifference. Paths were said
to be equal after 2110. Time horizons were chosen such that new-
borns at the time of the questionnaire still could be alive at the end of
the period. The Appendix A shows the exact wording.
Fig. 1 shows the two monotonically increasing consumption paths
that subjects could choose between in Q1. Growth rates decline over
time; the typical assumption in integrated assessment models. The
solid curve represents a policy that beneﬁts the near term to a larger
extent than the dashed curve.
Fig. 2 shows the options in Q2, one monotonically and one non-
monotonically increasing consumption path. The latter represents a
mild form of unsustainable development as the solid path overshoots
after having been the higher in the near-term. As will be shown
below, if subjects choose the solid curve in Q1 and the dashed curve in
Q2, this will be inconsistent with the use of the SWF.
The solid curve in Q2 differs from the simplifying assumption of
steady growth in integrated assessment models. While simpliﬁcation
is always needed, both Nordhaus and Stern point to essential factors
that have been left out of their models. Nordhaus and Boyer (1999)
writes that: “Outside of the rariﬁed and generally stylized models
used in the climate-change integrated-assessment models, there are
essentially no models of the world economy upon which to draw
(p.8).” Dasgupta (2008, p.149) observes that: “…it has become a habit
among economists to conﬁne attention to forecasts in which consump-
tion increases indeﬁnitely.” Accordingly, both Nordhaus and Stern build
on (mostly) exogenous assumptions about economic growth and they
study how climate change alters (mostly) predetermined consumption
paths. Whether climate change leads to non-monotonic consumption
paths in these studies is difﬁcult to say because the publications do
not show per capita consumption developments over time. Stern
alludes to this possibility in the executive summary when saying: “…
unabated climate change, whichwill eventually pose signiﬁcant threats
to growth.” (p.xiii). Negative effects on GDP per capita in Stern's study
range from zero to 35% in year 2200 (p.157).
Hourcade et al. (2009) call for “growth models that do not take the
stability of growth pathways for granted” and that capture “transitory
disequilibria”. This calls for models that capture delays, feedbacks, and0
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Fig. 2. Per capita consumption paths for Q2.nonlinearities.When such complications are in place, series of laborato-
ry experiments, all replicating ﬁeld data, show that misperceptions can
lead to non-monotonic developments, for instance: asset market
bubbles (Smith et al., 1988), renewable resource depletion (Moxnes,
1998), instability of supply chains (Sterman, 1989), bankruptcy of busi-
nesses with new and popular products (Paich and Sterman, 1993), and
ﬂuctuations in commodity markets (Arango and Moxnes, 2012). The
Great Depression of the 1930s and the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 illustrate
a widespread inability to forecast and, more importantly, a failure to
prevent non-monotonic global developments via the enactment of
stabilizing policies.
The overshooting path inQ2 is probably less representative of effects
of climate change than of for instance depletion of crude oil. If, at
on-going prices, production from oil reservoirs starts to decline faster
than alternatives to oil grow, oil prices will soar. The result could be
non-monotonic development in consumption. Even if this should not
be the most likely scenario, considerable uncertainty implies that
overshoots may occur and should inﬂuence decisions under uncertain-
ty. Furthermore, different underlying growth rates around the world
means that the likelihood of periods with negative growth is higher
for some groups than for others. For instance, the real median income
for men in the US has been nearly stagnant since 1970 (Commerce,
2012).
To test if subjects behave according to the SWF (H10), indifference
curves for Q1 and Q2 are used as benchmarks, see Fig. 3. The indiffer-
ence curves show combinations of parameters δ and η that give the
same value of W (Eq. (1)) for the two consumption paths in each of
the questions Q1 and Q2. On the x-axis is consumption elasticity η
over a range covering assumptions made by Nordhaus and Stern.
Indifference utility discount rates δ vary along the y-axis. Indifference
consumption discount rates can be found where η = 0 (Eq. (2)) and
are plus 1.78% p.a. for Q1 and minus 1.30% p.a. for Q2, respectively.
If subjects choose the solid path in Q1, the SWF predicts that they
have δ-values above the upper indifference curve. If they choose the
dashed path in Q2, the SWF predicts that they have δ-values below
the lower indifference curve. So, if subjects make exactly these two
choices, they cannot behave according to the SWF with one set of
parameters. H10 can be rejected.Fig. 4. Indifference curve for AWF for Q2.
Fig. 5. Per capita well-being paths for Q3, Q4, and Q5.
Fig. 6. Indifference curves based on the SWF for Q3, Q4, and Q5, and assumptionsmade by
Nordhaus and Stern.
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Stern. Nordhaus sets δ = 1.5% p.a. and η = 2.0 while Stern assumes
δ =0.1% p.a. and η=1.0. Nordhaus puts less weight on future genera-
tions than Stern, and puts more weight on the poorest and hence the
present generations in Q1 and Q2. Nordhaus' parameters favor the
solid paths in both Q1 and Q2. Stern's parameters suggest indifference
in Q1 and favor the solid path and hence the non-monotonic develop-
ment in Q2 — similar to Nordhaus.
When analyzing subjects' use of AWF (H20), the solid path in Q1
dominates the dashed path for all δ and α-values. This is because the
concave utility function favors stable over variable consumption
growth, and because the solid path has the more rapid growth in the
near-term. Fig. 4 shows the indifference curve for Q2 giving the same
W-values (Eq. (3)) for both paths over a wide set of α-values.3 Choosing
the dashed path in Q2 is consistentwith having δ-values at or below the
indifference curve. Contrary to the SWF and consistent with prior rea-
soning about the AWF, choosing the monotonic consumption path in
Q2 can be consistent with having positive δ-values, even higher than
Nordhaus' assumption for the SWF.
The questionnaire design avoids many of the problems associated
with stated preference surveys.4 The questionnaire could also be seen to
represent an example of information provided for policy debate and
decision-making. As such, the questionnaire will indicate to what extent
ordinary people are able to deal with time graphs of policy consequences.
The two questions were part of an online survey performed by
YouGov5 in the U.K. from 22 to 24 March 2011. Respondents were
drawn from a well-balanced sample of the adult U.K. population
(N = 2305). Efforts by YouGov to correct the results for minor imbal-
ances in the composition of the sample only led to corrections of
about one percentage point in frequencies. The analysis in this study is
based on uncorrected data. For those who answered both questions,
the median time spent was 8 min and 54 s. Ninety per cent of respon-
dents spent more than 5 min and 17 s, and 99% spent more than 2
min and 56 s.
3.2. Second Questionnaire
Climate change is expected to have effects that stretch beyond the
one hundred year time horizons in Q1 and Q2. Together with other re-
source limitations, long-term climate effects could seriously threaten
sustainability. The Brundtland report (1987) raised concern about “the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. Still there is
great uncertainty whether current policies lead to sustainable develop-
ment or not (Arrow et al., 2004). There is also much disagreement as
illustrated by the debate following the publication of “The Limits to
Growth” (Meadows et al., 1972).3 For α-values above 3, the utility function is nearly linear over the range of yearly
growth rates used in the scenarios.
4 The embedding effect and failure to recognize budget constraints (Diamond and
Hausman, 1994) should not apply because questions Q1 and Q2 pertain to total per capita
consumption. Wording could inadvertently inﬂuence responses. An attempt has been
made to come up with a conservative design; see the exact wording.
5 YouGov, 50 Featherstone Street, London EC1Y 8RT, http://www.yougov.com/.The second questionnaire addresses hypothetical scenarios over a
ﬁve hundred year time horizon, see Fig. 5 and the Appendix A. The
dashed line shows linear growth for hundred years followed by four
hundred years of zero growth. Respondents choose between this
dashed path and each of the solid paths in three consecutive questions
Q3, Q4, and Q5. While the solid curve in Q2 portrayed a ﬂuctuation,
solid curves in Q3, Q4, and Q5 represent overshoots without recovery,
a more severe type of unsustainable development.
All solid paths overshoot after having been higher than the dashed
path for the ﬁrst hundred years. While the dashed path ends up at 200
units, the solid paths end up at respectively 193, 156, and 70 units for
Q3, Q4, and Q5 after having peaked at 200 units. Different from Q1
and Q2, paths are said to represent “well-being per person — reﬂecting
private consumption, public services, and services provided by nature.”
The importance of the latter for integrated assessment models is dem-
onstrated by (Hoel and Sterner, 2007) and (Sterner and Persson, 2008).
The purpose of the second questionnaire is to see how these types of
overshoots inﬂuence implicit discount rates. Note that the solid path in
Q3 dominates the solid path in Q4, which in turn dominates the one in
Q5 whether welfare is measured by the SWF or the AWF. Thus, these
three scenarios should not produce choices that lead to rejection of
any of the two hypotheses.
Fig. 6 shows indifference curves for SWF when choosing between
the dashed and each of the solid paths. The curves are quite insensitive
to the value of η. Choosing the solid path in each of the three questions is
consistent with having utility discount rates lower than the respective
indifference curves. The scenarios are constructed such that Stern's pa-
rameters imply indifference between the dashed and the solid path in
Q3. Nordhaus' parameters imply indifference in Q5. Q4 represents an
in-between scenario to get a somewhat more detailed idea about the
distributions of discount rates.
Fig. 7 shows indifference curves for the AWF over a wide set of α-
values. Similar to Q2 and consistent with prior reasoning, indifference
utility discount rates are higher for the AWF than the SWF. Related to
the longer time horizon, upper limits for discount rates for the AWF
are lower in Q3, Q4, and Q5 than in Q2.
Respondents were recruited from a class of ﬁrst semester master
students with varied backgrounds and representing many different na-
tions (N= 52). To compare this group to themuch larger UK sample inFig. 7. Indifference curve for AWF for Q3, Q4, and Q5.
Table 1
Frequency of answers related to respective indifference curves in Fig. 3.
Q1 Q2
Relative to indifference curve Lower Equal Higher Lower Equal Higher
Frequency (%) 15.7 20.9 63.5 63.4 14.9 21.7
Table 2
Number of choices relative to the upper and lower indifference curves for Q1 and Q2 in
Fig. 3.
Q1
δ ≥ upper δ b upper
Q2 δ N lower 338 36
δ ≤ lower 1117 234
162 E. Moxnes / Ecological Economics 102 (2014) 158–166the ﬁrst questionnaire, the second group answered Q1 and Q2 before
answering Q3, Q4, and Q5.4. Results
4.1. First Questionnaire
Raw data are available from the author. The ensuing analyses focus
on the 1725 respondents (75%) that answered both Q1 and Q2.
Table 1 gives an overview of the results. In Q1, 84.3% chose the solid
curve consistent with a δ equal to or higher than the upper indifference
curve for the SWF (solid or indifferent). The percentage is signiﬁcantly
greater than 82.8% (binomial test at the 5%-level). Thus, a clearmajority
chose responses consistentwith a consumption discount rate equal to or
higher than 1.78% p.a.
In Q2, 78.4% chose the dashed curve consistent with a δ equal to or
lower than the lower indifference curve (dashed or indifferent), signif-
icantly greater than 76.7%. Thus, a clear majority chose responses
consistent with a consumption discount rate equal to or lower than
minus 1.30% p.a.
Among the 84% of individuals that chose the solid curve in Q1, 76.8%
(signiﬁcantly greater than 74.9%) chose the dashed curve in Q2, see
Table 2. If they behaved according to the SWF, they must have reduced
their utility discount rate from being above the upper indifferences
curve to being below the lower onewhen going from Q1 to Q2. Similar-
ly, it is also likely thatmany of the remaining 23.2% reduced their utility
discount rates when going from Q1 to Q2. However, their adjustments
were not large enough to favor the dashed development in Q2. Hence,
between 75 and 100% of respondents in the majority group appear to
change their preferences towards lower discount rates when going
from Q1 to Q2. A similar tendency cannot be ruled out for the minority
group with 16% of the subjects.6 H10 can be rejected.
Regarding the AWF, in Q1 only 16% clearly distinguished themselves
from the alternative predicted by the AWF.7 Hence a clear majority
seems to behave consistent or nearly consistent with the AWF. H20 can-
not be rejected. In Q2, 78.4% chose consistent with a utility discount rate
at or below the indifference curves in Fig. 4. In this case, negative utility
discount rates are not needed to explain choices; a result that seems
consistent with prior ideas about time preferences. H20 cannot be
rejected.4.2. Second Questionnaire
Raw data are available from the author. Of the 52 respondents, one
subject did not answer all ﬁve questions. Six respondents gave answers
to Q3, Q4, and Q5 that were not consistent with dominance. Most likely
they would have changed their responses after being made aware of6 Among the 16% of respondents in Q1 that chose answers consistent with a δ value be-
low the upper indifference curve, 87% (signiﬁcantly greater than 82%)made a choice in Q2
consistent with a δ value equal to or below the lower indifference curve. It seems likely
that many in this group also lowered their implicit discount rate when going from Q1 to
Q2. Although less likely, this could also have been the case for some of the 13% of respon-
dents in this group who preferred the non-monotonic consumption path in Q2.
7 The21%who found both alternatives inQ1 equally good, donot count heavily towards
rejection of the hypothesis since the welfare of the two consumption paths differ quite
modestly. For α in the range from 0.5 to 2.0 and δ in the range from 0.1 to 1.5% p.a., differ-
ences between the criterion values for the two consumption paths fall in the range from
3.6 to 7.2%.dominance. These respondents were not included in the below analysis.
Conclusions would not change if they were.
The second group differed somewhat from the UK sample. In Q1,
64.4% answered consistent with a utility discount rate at or higher
than the upper indifference curve for the SWF, compared to 84.4% in
the UK sample (signiﬁcantly different at the 1% level). In Q2, 88.9%
answered consistent with a utility discount rate at or below the lower
indifference curve, compare to 78.3% in the UK sample (signiﬁcantly
different at the 4% level). The differences do not lead to different conclu-
sions. The student group tends to value the long-term somewhat higher
than the UK respondents.
Regarding the SWF, ﬁrst consider implicit utility discount rates for
Q5, Q4, and Q3 for Nordhaus' assumption about the consumption elas-
ticity, η= 2.0. Combining Fig. 6 and Table 3, it is seen that 8.9% have
an implicit utility discount rate higher than Nordhaus' assumption of
δ = 1.5. Only 2.2% have δ-values in the range from 0.81 to 1.5%
p.a.; 17.8% have δ-values in the range from 0.0 to 0.81% p.a.; 2.2%
have a δ equal to 0.0% p.a.; and 68.9% have a δ below 0.0% p.a. Clearly,
the average implicit discount rate is signiﬁcantly different from
Nordhaus' assumption.
Next, consider implicit utility discount rates at Stern's assumption
about the consumption elasticity, η= 1.0. At this η-value, the three δ-
values denoting indifference are 1.43, 0.91, and 0.10% p.a., of which
the latter coincides with Stern's assumption. The spread of implicit
discount rates is the same as for Nordhaus' assumption about η. While
a majority makes use of lower discount rates than Stern, we cannot
conclude from these data that the average discount rate is signiﬁcantly
different from Stern's assumption.
Regarding theAWF, forα=2.5, the three δ-values denoting indiffer-
ence are 1.91, 1.38, and 0.75% p.a. For α = 1.0, the three δ-values
denoting indifference are 2.66, 2.08, and 1.46% p.a. Again the spread of
implicit discount rates is the same as above. For α-values in the range
from 1.0 to 2.5, the majority has an implicit discount rate below an
upper limit ranging from 1.46 to 0.75% p.a. This is considerably lower
than the upper limit for δ in Q2, Fig. 4. The data are not sufﬁciently de-
tailed to claim signiﬁcant difference between average implicit discount
rates in the ﬁrst and the second questionnaire. However, it is an inter-
esting question for further research to see if the implicit discount rate
drops with the time horizon.
Regarding people's ability to choose between policies, choices in Q3,
Q4, and Q5 seem consistent with choices in Q2. Of those that chose the
dashed path in Q2, respectively 74, 92, and 95% chose the dashed paths
in Q3, Q4, and Q5. Among those that chose the solid path in Q2, respec-
tively 80, 40, and 40% chose the solid paths in Q3, Q4, and Q5.
For choices of both dashed and solid in Q2, percentages change in the
expected directions as the discrepancy between dashed and solid in-
creases fromQ3 toQ5.Hence, people seem to be able tomake consistent
choices.
5. Discussion
5.1. The Deterministic Case
When choosing between monotonically increasing consumption
paths, Q1 suggests that SWF is appropriate, even when used with con-
sumption discount rates that reﬂect current rates of return, as assumed
byNordhaus. Q2 reveals that people dislike overshooting and ﬂuctuating
Table 3
Frequency of answers related to respective indifference curves in Figs. 6 and 7.
Q3 Q4 Q5
Relative to indifference curve Lower Equal Higher Lower Equal Higher Lower Equal Higher
Frequency (%) 68.9 2.2 28.9 88.9 0.0 11.1 91.1 0.0 8.9
163E. Moxnes / Ecological Economics 102 (2014) 158–166consumption developments and more so than what is implied by
assumptions made by both Nordhaus and Stern. Importantly, one and
the same SWF cannot explain subject choices in both Q1 and Q2. Subject
responses imply that H10 should be rejected. The SWF theory could be
saved by an auxiliary hypothesis saying that parameters vary with
consumption scenarios. However, this would complicate analysis.
Aversion to overshoots and ﬂuctuations is also likely to be in effect
when consumption does not recover after an overshoot. Such a situation
could occur if a stagnating or slowly growing economy (for other rea-
sons than climate change) is negatively affected by worsening climate
conditions. For such a case, questions Q3, Q4, and Q5 reveal average im-
plicit utility discount rate for the SWF close to Stern's assumption of 0.1%
p.a. and signiﬁcantly lower than Nordhaus' assumption.
The potential problem of unsustainable development has led to
several proposals to improve the SWF. One option is hyperbolic
discounting, where the discount rate decreases over time (Kirby,
1997). This idea is supported by the use of questionnaires. However, re-
lated to the choice in Q2, all positive and declining utility discount rates
favor the non-monotonic development. Another alternative is the rank-
discounted utilitarian approach (Zuber and Asheim, 2012). This criteri-
on most aggressively discounts the wealthier generations and thus has
attractive fairness properties. However, for positive rank utility rates,
this criterion also favors non-monotonic development in Q2.
The AWF with one set of parameters did predict correctly majority
choices in all ﬁve questions. As predicted by prior reasoning, the AWF al-
lows for somewhat higher utility discount rates that the SWF. While
promising, further research is needed to check for potential weaknesses
of the AWF and to establish parameters that reﬂect people's preferences.
Inspired by the literature on ‘naturalistic decisionmaking’ (Lipshitz et al.,
2001), research onwelfare functions should focus on very-long-termde-
velopments of consumption or well-being. Previous research shows that
the time horizon matters for discount rate estimates (Frederick et al.,
2002). For analysis, it seems less problematic to adjust discount rates to
ﬁxed time horizons than to consumption scenarios that vary with
outcomes of random variables. Also, it seems interesting to explore the
choice between relative and absolute growth in the AWF.
Because of complexity and the potential for subjectivity, general
agreement on the superiority of one particular welfare function is un-
likely. Agreement on one set of parameters is also unlikely. Even those
who insist on basing the consumption discount rate on market rates
of return face a challenge. The SWF requires two parameters, δ and η.
The Ramsey equation provides a relationship between these two pa-
rameters and the consumption discount rate derived from the market
rate of return.8 Since there are two unknowns in this equation, a prior
estimate must be used for one of them. Since prior estimates are highly
uncertain,9 values of δ and η come to vary over awide range. This uncer-
tainty is important because optimal policies can be sensitive to the8 TheRamsey equation expresses the consumptiondiscount rate asρt≈ δ+ ηgtwhere gt
denotes growth of consumption at time t. An estimate of δ can be found from a prior esti-
mate of η and by setting ρt equal to an estimate of the market rate of return.
9 For instance, Atkinson et al. (2009) point out that η reﬂects preferences over three di-
mensions: risk, inequality in space, and inequality in time. Theoretical arguments hold that
measures of these three concerns should be strongly related. However, empirical investi-
gations show that “correlations between attitudes to risk, inequality and intertemporal
substitution areweak” (p.1). This provides one possible explanation for why empirical es-
timates of η have varied “all the way from 0 to 10” (p.3).resulting combination of δ and η. The same is the case for AWF; optimal
policies are in general sensitive to the combination of δ and α.
Realizing major challenges, Koopmans (1965, p.226) noted: “… the
problemof optimal growth is too complicated, or at least too unfamiliar,
for one to feel comfortable inmaking an entirely a priori choice of an op-
timality criterion before one knows the implications of alternative
choices. One may wish to choose between principles on the basis of
the results of their application.” Hence, Koopmans suggests that focus
should be on results, in this case on the consumption paths that follow
from policies.
Policy alternatives can be derived in different ways. First, Koopmans
suggested a trial-and-error approachwhere the criterion is iterated until
an optimal policy results that gives a desirable consumption develop-
ment over time. According to the above analysis, iterations should not
be conﬁned to parameter values; they should also include functional
forms of criteria such as the SWF and the AWF. Second, one could short-
cut Koopmans' procedure by iterating policies directly in simulation
models until desirable developments over time result. For this purpose,
formulating a welfare function is not needed; analysts judge the prom-
ise of policies by inspecting simulated time developments. Third,
analysts could simulate policies proposed by policy-makers to see how
these more intuitively based policies perform compared to those that
result from formal analysis.
The above should not be read to say that analysts are the ones to
choose between policies. Their role is to develop models, identify
policies, and show policy consequences in terms of time developments,
ideally in competition with other analysts. The questionnaires show
that most people are both willing and able to make judgments and
choose among policies. Choices were signiﬁcantly different from ran-
dom and did show considerable amounts of consistency. Information
and debate could, and should, help correct possible framing effects.
Importantly, this procedure and role of analysts is different from cur-
rent practice where policy makers are presented with policies that fol-
low from optimization and welfare functions that Koopmans claimed
to be “too complicated”. The wide spread in recommended GHG taxes
suggests that complexity allows for subjectivity. Neither Nordhaus nor
Stern shows paths of per capita consumption or other indicators of
well-being. If they had, focus of the debate would probably have shifted
away from discount rates and towards questioning the quality of the
underlying assessment models.
Stern reports on three methods to analyze climate policies. The two
ﬁrstmethods give reasons for strong policymeasures; the thirdmethod
considers the economics of these policies. Stern uses the simulation
model PAGE where: “…policies are speciﬁed by the user, and PAGE cal-
culates their implications” (Hope et al., 1993, p.328). Having made use
of simulation, Stern could have presented policy implications in terms
of time developments. However, Stern uses the SWF to ﬁnd the social
costs of GHG emissions and hence GHG tax rates. Stern's low values of
δ and ηmake the policy recommendations from the two ﬁrst methods
appear economical (near optimal). Since Stern does not show time de-
velopments for consumption, it is difﬁcult to judge the reasonableness
of his parameter assumptions in light of the above ﬁndings.
In his DICE model Nordhaus uses intertemporal optimization to ﬁnd
optimal taxes on greenhouse gases and to ﬁnd optimal global invest-
ments. In this case both the tax policy and the social cost of GHG emis-
sions follow from the SWF and its parameters. Within this framework
Nordhaus argues that to be consistent, the consumption discount rate
164 E. Moxnes / Ecological Economics 102 (2014) 158–166must be equal to the current market rate of return.10 If a different
consumption discount rate were used in the DICE model, it would
have important implications for savings rates and current investments.
To point out inconsistency in Stern's analysis, Nordhaus writes: “[t]o a
ﬁrst approximation, the Review's assumptions about time discounting
and the consumption elasticity would lead to a doubling of the optimal
global net savings rate” (p. 694). While this is correct within Nordhaus'
optimization model, it does not follow that Stern's GHG tax would lead
to a doubling.
By implementing Stern's GHG tax in a macroeconomic simulation
model or in the real economy, short- and medium-term economic
growth would most probably be somewhat reduced. The same would
be the case for savings rates and investments. There would be no
doubling. An historical example illustrates this point. To maintain
long-term biodiversity, the International Whaling Commission banned
commercial whaling in 1986. To justify such a ban on economic
grounds, they would have had to apply a discount rate much below
the current market rate of return (Clark, 1973). The policy had indistin-
guishable effects on global investments.
Hence the challenge for policy makers is to identify special-purpose
policies to prevent climate change as well as other undesired very-long-
term developments. Similarly, special-purpose policies could be used to
encourage investments in long-lived dams for hydro electricity, infra-
structure, and other means to ensure long-term sustainability. The dis-
count rate is not a general-purpose policy instrument as long as there is
a risk of non-monotonic growth. This said, when special purpose policies
are in place to deal with very-long-term issues, the market rate of return
will be a proper indicator for the discount rate to be used for all decisions
that are of little consequence for very-long-term developments.
Dasgupta (2008) reaches a related conclusion when saying that in a
fully optimizing economy it is appropriate to discount future consump-
tion at market rates of return. In the context of the present paper, “fully
optimizing” should be interpreted to mean an economy with special-
purpose policies to prevent overshoots and unsustainable developments.5.2. The Case of Uncertainty
The deterministic case resolves much of the current controversy over
discounting. The next step is to consider uncertainty. Standard methods
are problematic.11 First, there is a need for better models that allow for
rare events and that capture complex dynamics. Second, the search for
policies calls for optimization models with robust welfare functions.
Third, newmethods areneeded to portraypolicy consequences over time.
Stocks, feedback processes, and uncertainty complicate the search
for good policies. Optimization theory provides insights (Bertsekas,
1987). In inﬁnite horizon stochastic models, yearly decisions should
in general be nonlinear functions of all current stocks. Hence, the
GHG-tax in any year should be a feedback policy of important stocks.
Measurement error implies that both current and recentmeasurements
of stock levels should be considered in order to ﬁlter out noise. Param-
eter error implies that updated (recursive) parameter estimates should
inﬂuence decisions. That is, decisions today should take into consider-
ation that over time one will have more precise information and that
future decisions will be adapted to the new information.
For given policy functions, Monte Carlo simulations present an inter-
esting alternative to explore policy consequences. A challenge in this10 As justiﬁcation for this assumption Nordhaus points to the likely behavior of individ-
ual countries bargaining about emission reductions. However, this argument does not
hold from a normative point of view. When confronted with a global commons problem,
nations should aim for perfect cooperation and not Nash equilibrium.
11 According to Weitzmann (2007, p.704) “…standard approaches to climate change
(even those that purport to treat uncertainty) fail to account fully for the implications of
large consequences with small probabilities…” Dasgupta (2008, p.167) concludes: “… if
the uncertainties associatedwith climate change losses are large, the formulation of inter-
generational well-being we economists have grown used to could lead to ethical para-
doxes even when the uncertainties are thin-tailed: an optimum policy may not exist.”case is to ﬁnd ways to present developments over time. Thousand
simulated developments in one graph tend to bemessy. Presenting per-
centiles for each and every year could mask ﬂuctuating paths. Using
software to count the number of paths that fall into certain behavior
groups would be more useful. That would give analysts and decision-
makers a sense of probabilities of overshooting relative to monotonic
developments and of high relative to low consumption levels.
Uncertainty complicates and makes it more desirable to make use of
optimization to identify policies. On the other hand, high complexity
makes it impossible to ﬁnd fully optimal policies. However, the less ambi-
tious task of policy improvement is still an option. UsingMonte Carlo sim-
ulations, software can search for parameters in ﬂexible policy functions
that maximize a welfare function (Powersim, 2013). Such optimization
in policy space has provided policy improvement in complex problems
with measurement error (Moxnes, 2003) and with parameter uncertain-
ty (Moxnes, 2010). Stochastic optimization in policy space requires a
welfare function that captures expectedwelfare. In practice this is obtain-
ed by calculating average welfare over all Monte Carlo runs for a given
policy. For this purpose the AWF seems more robust than the SWF.
How does the above approach compare to Nordhaus' and Stern's
methods? Nordhaus operates with a deterministic model such that his
recommendations do not reﬂect uncertainty. Stern uses the PAGE
model with the SWF and Monte Carlo simulations to study the effects
of uncertainty inmore than 30parameters.With quite symmetric distri-
butions around expected parameter values, and a concave utility func-
tion (η = 1), uncertainty leads to reduced utility. Hence, uncertainty
increases the present social cost of climate change and calls for higher
GHG taxes than that resulting from a deterministic scenario.
The above approaches are complex and it is tempting to retract to
the simpler approach indicated by Pindyck (2013): “Perhaps the best
we can do is comeupwith rough, subjective estimates of the probability
of a climate change sufﬁciently large to have a catastrophic impact, and
then some distribution for the size of that impact…” Hence, if analysis
ﬁnds that the probability of catastrophic runaway climate change is un-
acceptably high, further analysis could be reduced to study least-cost
strategies to reduce GHG emissions well below safe upper limits
(Ackerman et al., 2009; Pindyck, 2013). Currently, there does not
seem to be convincing evidence of sufﬁciently large catastrophic im-
pacts to agree on some least-cost strategy. Without such evidence,
there is need for advanced model studies of policies to avoid potential
overshoots in consumption or well-being.
6. Conclusions
Controversy over discounting is likely to weaken the impact of eco-
nomic analysis of climate policies and of policies for sustainable develop-
ment. This is worrisome because without good understanding, people
tend to favor intuitively appealing wait-and-see strategies (Sterman,
2008; Moxnes and Saysel, 2009). Controversy follows from optimization
and use of intertemporal welfare functions that Koopmans (1965)
claimed to be “too complicated”. A natural question arises; could one do
without welfare functions and discounting when choosing between poli-
cies?Using twoquestionnaires it is found thatwhenpeople are presented
with graphs of policy consequences over time (per capita consumption or
well-being), they are able to make consistent choices. The paper also of-
fers some ideas for how uncertainty could be captured in such graphs.
Policy alternatives can be based on intuition, follow from simulation
studies, or result from optimization. The latter method requires the use
of welfare functions. The ﬁrst questionnaire ﬁnds that the standard (so-
cial) welfare function (SWF) explains well people's choices among
steadily increasing consumption paths, with implicit discount rates sim-
ilar to market rates of return. However the very same SWF is not able to
capture people's aversion to overshoots and ﬂuctuations. The second
questionnaire ﬁnds that when long-term sustainability is threatened,
people tend to use very low discount rates. Among the respondents,
91% choose as if they use the SWF with a utility discount rate lower
165E. Moxnes / Ecological Economics 102 (2014) 158–166than Nordhaus' assumption of 1.5% p.a. A remarkable 71% reveal a
discount rate close to or below Stern's assumption of 0.1% p.a.
It follows that it is problematic to use the SWF to search for optimal
policies unless ﬂuctuating or overshooting consumption paths can be
ruled out. Ruling out such behaviors is particularly difﬁcult in models
that capture uncertainty; a complication that increases the relative
advantage of optimizationwhen searching for policies. For this purpose,
an alternative welfare function (AWF) reﬂecting per capita consump-
tion growth is found to be largely consistent with subjects' choices in
both of the two questionnaires.
To resolve the controversy between Nordhaus and Stern, more
thorough studies of the potential for overshoots and unsustainable
developments are needed.
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Appendix A
A.1. Questionnaire 1
Respondents received the following text (ﬁgures are shown in the
main body of the paper and all questions have the same wording and
are not repeated):
Imagine that you are going to participate in a referendum about gov-
ernmental policies that will inﬂuence consumption development over
the next one hundred years. Think of consumption as the sum of private
consumption and public services. You get no information about what
the policies are. However, you will see the exact consequences of the
policies on national consumption development per person.
Your personal consumption will develop in pace with national
consumption. When choosing between consumption developments,
pay close attention to how consumption develops over your expected
lifetime. You may also consider the future consumption of your own
and friends' children and grandchildren. Be honest about how much of
your own consumption you are willing to give up for children and
grandchildren that will enjoy higher consumption than you.
The effects of two different consumption development policies are
shown as Solid and Dashed lines on the below graph. [Fig. 1 in article]
Solid shows steady growth and in the last year consumption is 4
times higher than in 2010. Dashed also shows steady growth, however,
it has lower consumption than Solid until 2057, after that Dashed gives
the higher consumption. After year 2110, the two consumption
developments are equal.
Q1: Which of the developments, Solid or Dashed, do you prefer?
I prefer Solid development
I prefer Dashed development
I ﬁnd both developments equally good
I cannot answer the question
Like in the previous question, the effects of two different consump-
tion development policies are shown as Solid and Dashed lines on the
below graph. [Fig. 2]
Dashed shows steady growth such that in the last year consumption
is 4 times higher than in 2010. Solid does not show steady growth,
and shows a decline in consumption for a 12 year long period after
2045. However, Solid does give higher consumption than Dashed until2052, after that Dashed has the higher consumption. After year 2110,
the two consumption developments are equal. [Q2: samewording asQ1]A.2. Questionnaire 2
Respondentsﬁrst answeredQuestionnaire 1; then theywent on toQ3.
Q3. Like in the previous questions, the effects of two different
policies are shown as Solid and Dashed lines on the below graph.
Note however that in this case the time horizon is extended to
500 years. Think of the paths as representing well-being per person —
reﬂecting private consumption of goods and services, public services,
and services provided by nature.
[Fig. 5 in paper with the dashed and the solid curve for Q3 only]
Dashed shows growth along a straight line until well-being doubles
after 100 years. After that, Dashed is constant and equal to 200 units.
Solid grows faster thanDashed to beginwith. Then it growsmore slowly
than Dashed towards 200 units. After 100 years, Solid declines for about
twenty years and ends up at 193 units for the rest of the time. [Q3: same
wording as Q1]
Q4. This question is identical to Q3 except that Solid ends up at 156
units rather than 193 units.
[Fig. 5 in paper with the dashed and the solid curve for Q4 only]
Dashed shows growth along a straight line until well-being doubles
after 100 years. After that, Dashed is constant and equal to 200 units.
Solid grows faster thanDashed to beginwith. Then it growsmore slowly
than Dashed towards 200 units. After 100 years, Solid declines for about
sixty years and ends up at 156 units for the rest of the time. [Q4: same
wording as Q1]
Q5. This question is identical to Q4 except that Solid ends up at 70
units rather than 156 units.
[Fig. 5 in paper with the dashed and the solid curve for Q5 only]
Dashed shows growth along a straight line until well-being doubles
after 100 years. After that, Dashed is constant and equal to 200 units.
Solid grows faster thanDashed to beginwith. Then it growsmore slowly
than Dashed towards 200 units. After 100 years, Solid declines for about
hundred and ten years and ends up at 70 units for the rest of the time.
[Q5: same wording as Q1]References
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